Abstract
I. Introduction
From 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) adopted a range of nonconventional monetary policies in its efforts to tackle the euro area sovereign debt crisis, a number of national banking crises and widespread economic stagnation/recession. These policies represent a radical departure from the ECB's pre-crisis focus upon interest rates and money supply designed to meet its low inflation mandate established in the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union, TEU). The central role played by the ECB during the sovereign debt crisis also attracted considerable public attention. Both the economic impact and the legality of ECB nonconventional monetary policies became topics of considerable academic and public debate.
Our contribution to this panel on the ECB's power and accountability is to present the argument that the ECB's use of nonconventional monetary policies since the outbreak of the euro area sovereign debt crisis significantly undermined both its democratic legitimacy and the legitimacy of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) project more generally.
The remainder of this introduction summarizes the most influential arguments that defend the democratic legitimacy of the European Union (EU) and, more specifically, the EMU project and the ECB's role. It sets out the main premises of our argument. In the following three sections, we discuss how the ECB's nonconventional monetary policies and the perception thereof increasingly undermined the traditional basis of its legitimacy: the clarity and transparency of the central bank's mandate; the redistributive implications of its policies; and the non-politicization of its policy-making. This paper concludes by summarizing how the strength of most of the key arguments that can be used to defend the ECB's democratic legitimacy were weakened in the course of the crisis. We finish by discussing potential future developments that could work to reinforce ECB legitimacy. This paper focuses upon the direct and indirect implications of the ECB's nonconventional monetary policy but also considers the implications of the ECB's Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA), which is not a monetary policy tool. We lack the space to examine the implications of the ECB's role in the so-called 'Troika' -along with the European Commission and International Monetary Fund (IMF) -which imposed fiscal policy reforms upon programme countries seeking European-level financial assistance. 1 The EU is often accused of having a democratic deficit, because the European Parliament (EP) and national parliaments are perceived to be too weak in a range of policy areas and because delegation to executive agencies (even further removed from parliaments) is high. 2 These critiques have been countered by a number of authors who have come out in defense of the EU's political system. Many of these counterarguments are particularly relevant for the ECB.
Majone argues that the democratic standards that should be applied to the EU depend largely on the nature of integration: If the European project is viewed as comprising political integration, the standards should come close to those of a parliamentary democracy. 3 If, by contrast, integration is mainly economic, then economics and politics should be 'kept as separate as possible' 4 and European policy-making should be depoliticized. In addition, Majone contends that criticisms of technocracy, non-transparency, insufficient public participation and limited mechanisms of control would equally apply to non-majoritarian institutions outside the EU, such as national central banks and regulatory agencies. 5 Majone argues that institutions such as the ECB are legitimate if their mandate is specified, their decision-making processes well defined, their decisions justified, the policy outcomes sound, and if they have the necessary expertise and a willingness to protect diffuse interests. In the case of the ECB, Majone perceives low inflation to be a clear mandate and considers ECB independence as necessary to overcome the diversity of national views on monetary policy. 6 Moravcsik shares the view that EU policy-making is technocratic and benefits from depolitization. 7 He argues that the EU's functions -for example central banking -have often a lower electoral salience and are also delegated by states to national central banks, courts or agencies in order to 'insulate' them from politics. In addition, the EU's institutions are limited by narrow mandates and constrained by super-majoritarian decision-making, for example in the Council of Ministers. Moravcsik thus defends the high degree of 'insulation' of EU policymaking, 8 insofar as:
• Most EU policies are regulatory and economic with only limited (re)distributive effects.
Most 'political' policies (for example, migration) remain largely intergovernmental and draw their legitimacy directly from elected national governments.
• The EU lacks a range of more politicized competences, including fiscal priorities, social welfare provision and taxation.
• The political system with its multi-level structure, plural executive and distribution of power across several institutions is geared towards the protection of minorities.
• Legitimacy stems from a variety of sources, such as elected national governments and the EP.
• Semi-autonomous judges and technocrats require insulation to produce policy outcomes in the general interest based on expertise 'in areas where most citizens remain "rationally ignorant" or non-participatory.' • the presence of (and adherence to) a clear mandate assigned by national governments;
• the absence of (highly visible) redistributive effects;
• the low political salience of ECB policies.
II. Undermining the clarity of the ECB's mandate
As discussed above, the ECB's legitimacy is often seen as unproblematic in the literature, based on a firm assumption that its actions are framed by a clear and narrow mandate that had been defined by elected national governments in the process of Treaty negotiations. Top ECB officials have also frequently defended the legitimacy of its policy-making in these terms. 12 The
Maastricht Treaty and the Statute establishing the ECB and European System of Central Banks stipulate that the ECB must give primacy to the pursuit of low inflation, only after the achievement of which it can seek to achieve other goals, including economic growth. Second, The ECB argued repeatedly that its medium-term goal was consistently respected. 14 These claims, however, did not stop criticism of the potential inflationary implications of nonconventional monetary policies from a range of credible observers. 15 We argue that the economic reality of the inflationary impact of the ECB's nonconventional monetary policy mattered less than the perception of potential inflationary impact for the central bank's legitimacy.
Debates initially focused on the inflationary impact of the ECB's liquidity boosting measures -notably, the purchase of covered bank bonds -and the ECB's Securities Markets Programme (SMP) -specifically, the purchase of sovereign debt on secondary markets of those euro area
Member States most at risk of default and facing high bond yields. The ECB consistently argued that the SMP would not create inflation -that it could 'sterilize' the purchase of sovereign debt. 16 A number of economists argued that the amounts involved in the debt purchases were very small in relation to the ECB's overall operations. 17 Nonetheless, the ECB's repeated insistence upon 'sterilization' was an important political message directed notably at the German government, central bank and population that the bank's actions would not create inflation. 18 The political salience of low inflation was particularly significant in Germany given both the population's longstanding inflation aversion -and prioritization of low inflation over other socioeconomic goals -and the Christian Democrat Party's longstanding efforts to associate the EMU project with the pursuit of low inflation and broader macroeconomic policy stability. 19 Thus, the economic argument that the SMP did not in itself fundamentally undermine inflation was less important than the very real perception that it could do soespecially if widened to include the sovereign debt of a larger range of Member States. The diversion from the pursuit of low inflation thus, in itself, politicized ECB monetary policy for a large section of the German political class and public (see below).
The repeated inability of the ECB to neutralize fully the inflationary impact of its sovereign debt purchases through 'sterilization' fueled scrutiny and criticism. Between October 2010 and In response to rising sovereign debt yields in a number of Member States and notably Greece, the ECB adopted the SMP (2010-2012). The logic behind the policy was that by purchasing the sovereign debt of specific euro periphery Member States on secondary markets, the ECB would help bring down debt yields, thus enabling governments to fund themselves at lower rates. Economic studies 22 suggest a short-term effect of the SMP, notably in terms lowering yields. The ECB made clear publicly that it would hold these bonds to maturity -without revealing those maturities. Under the SMP, the ECB purchased approximately €220 billion worth of Greek, Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish government bonds. The SMP was widely criticized for breaking the ban on the monetary financing of debt and transforming the ECB into, de facto, a 'lender of last resort'. The Bundesbank held firm in its opposition. Jens
Weidmann publicly queried the legality of the ECB's de facto 'monetary financing' of debt as contrary to EU Treaty provisions. 23 In 2012, Peter Gauweiler, the deputy head of the Bavarian Christian Social Union, joined with Bruno Bandulet, Roman Huber, Johann Heinrich von Stein and the German political party Die Linke to bring a case against the ECB to the German Constitutional Court that was subsequently referred to the European Court of Justice. 24 In early August 2011, the ECB stepped up -considerably -its sovereign bond-buying programme, extending this to cover Italian and Spanish government debt. The shift was important because, the SMP was extended to lower the bond yields not only of 'Programme countries' -that is, the three euro area Member States that were subject to macroeconomic policy programmes managed and monitored by a 'Troika' of the ECB, the European Commission and the IMF -but also of two countries that were not subject to 'Troika' involvement. Thus, through the extension of the SMP, the ECB acted as a de facto 'lender of last resort' without the quid pro quo of fiscal/macroeconomic policy constraint. Jean-Claude
Trichet performed a delicate balancing act, insisting publicly that the ECB was not a 'lender of last resort' and that the SMP was not driven by the goal of maintaining government solvency but rather was a 'temporary and limited' measure adopted for monetary policy reasons and, specifically, the need to restore a better transmission of the bank's interest rate decisions -a claim made necessary for legal reasons. 25 The SMP was ended in September 2012 when the ECB announced its OMT programme. conditionality. The OMT undermined less forcefully the ECB's mandate -notably the primacy assigned to its pursuit of low inflation -in that unlimited ECB purchase of sovereign debt could only come with (promises of) significant national structural reform designed to help governments meet their macroeconomic commitments embedded in the Maastricht Treaty, notably on public spending deficits and debt levels. However, the OMT amounted to a significant unilateral extension of the potential fiscal policy powers that the ECB assigned to itself -albeit via the EFSF/ESM -without much consultation with Member State governments.
Specifically, the ECB assigned itself influence over the imposition of fiscal and macroeconomic policy commitments upon governments and an indirect monitoring role -with the EFSF/ESM -of their progress in meeting these commitments.
On 22 January 2015, the ECB launched its QE programme with a promise to buy, from March of that year, €60bn worth per month of mostly government bonds purchased on secondary markets until at least September 2016 -a total of €1.1 trillion. The programme was not completely new, in the sense that it included two existing programmes -the asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP) and the covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3), which were both launched in late 2014. Officially, the ECB sought to stimulate euro area credit markets (bank lending) and economic growth and to diminish the risk of deflation. It intended to continue the programme until it saw 'a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation that is consistent with its aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2 [per cent] over the medium term'. 27 Yet again, the desired and real effect of ECB policy was to lower government bond yields -albeit this time throughout the euro area. Importantly, the impact on different
Member State sovereign debt varied, with yields on German bunds already at historic lows.
The perceived (distributive) impact of these policies upon savers and financial firms in a number of countries -particularly in Germany -became a major political issue. For the German federal transport minister, Alexander Dobrindt, 'the disappearance of interest rates [created] a gaping hole in citizens' old age preparations', a particularly sensitive topic in a country with a rapidly ageing population. 28 Negative interest rates undermined the core business models of German pension funds, life insurers and a large section of the German banking systemspecifically small savings banks and cooperatives -which were legally required to guarantee a fixed rate of return. 29 ECB President Mario Draghi fought back against this kind of criticism, arguing that the German government had to assume responsibility for the difficulties facing its savings and cooperative banks, while the ECB's legal obligation was to bring inflation closer to target.
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IV. The political salience of ECB policies and their perceived redistributive effects
As the ECB's crisis policies pushed against the boundaries of its mandate, they became were meant to achieve.
The interest of governments, political parties and the general public in ECB monetary policy also increased from start of the sovereign debt crisis, at least in part due to the greater visibility of the impact -or at least the perceived impact -of this policy. On the one hand, the extremely low interest rates affected negatively some economic models. On the other hand, the provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to euro area countries unable to access bond markets gave the ECB considerable power to interfere directly in Member State macroeconomic policymaking and thus indirectly created distributive effects within countries. The ECB's intervention in Ireland is a good example of the significant power that the central bank could wield in relation to euro area national governments in need of emergency funding. The ECB agreed to provide ELA to Irish financial institutions only if the Irish government sought a bailout from euro area
Member States in November 2010 -which it did shortly afterwards. 35 In addition, the ECB demanded that the Irish government accept fiscal consolidation and structural reform, and that it recapitalize and restructure Irish banks. Such ECB demands became more frequent as the sovereign debt crisis intensified in 2011 and were also made of non-programme Member State governments -notably Italy and Spain. The ECB's decision to limit the level of emergency liquidity to Greek banks in June 2015 -forcing the Greek government to close banks and impose capital controls -put into the spotlight both the power of the ECB but also its exposed position as a non-majoritarian body with such power. 36 The ECB Governing Council took the decision without warning at an emergency meeting on a Sunday and a week prior to the Greek referendum on bail-out terms.
A number of euro area Member State governments publicly challenged ECB monetary policy.
Criticism was not new. From senior French politicians -including the president -there had previously been regular criticisms of the low inflation-focus of the ECB when the euro was perceived to be too strong in relation to the dollar and other major international currencies, which had a perceived negative impact on exports. 37 However, government criticism of ECB policy-making following the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis was far greater and owed to both nonconventional monetary policies and the ECB's role in the 'Troika'.
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The German government was loudest in its criticism of nonconventional monetary policies. In 
V. Conclusion
Over the course of the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB's nonconventional monetary policies blurred the boundaries of the central bank's mandate and undermined the transparency of both its own monetary policy and the implications of this monetary policy for national macroeconomic policy. As a result of these changes, many arguments that had been used to support the democratic legitimacy of the ECB's policies became less obviously valid. Notably, the ideas that ECB independence is legitimate as it is framed by a clear mandate, that ECB policy-making is non-distributive and that it is technocratic and depoliticized were undermined.
1.
ECB independence is unproblematic in the context of a clear mandate.
In the course of the crisis, the ECB's mandate became stretched and blurred. While the ECB never officially renounced its original mandate, it adopted a number of monetary policies where it is clear that price stability was neither the primary objective nor the intended effect. Similarly, while the European Court of Justice ruled that ECB policies did not break the treaty provision that prohibits the monetary financing of sovereign debt, the ECB rubbed against the boundaries of legality on this matter. Moreover, the stretching and blurring of mandates and the use of justifications that appeared not to explain in full the objective of policies created a lack of transparency and reduced the ECB's legitimacy.
2.
The ECB does not require close political oversight, as its policies are not However, the impact of low and then negative real interest rates upon some national financial 48 We are left with an apparent contradiction. On the one hand, the ECB's nonconventional monetary policy enabled euro area periphery governments to maintain levels of public spending -or to diminish these levels less than they would have had to -which had implications on social welfare provision, taxation and the pursuit of other structural reforms. On the other hand, the bulk of ECB communication on macroeconomic policy almost always pushed in favour of structural reform.
3.
Delegation of decision-making powers to technocratic institutions is legitimate where policy outcomes require high levels of expertise, are in the general interest and are 'in areas where most citizens remain "rationally ignorant" or non-participatory'.
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ECB policy-making requires, without a doubt, high levels of expertise. But it is questionable whether this 'area' was one where most citizens remained passive -at least at the height of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. The legitimacy of both the ECB's indirect fiscal policy rolethrough its nonconventional monetary policies -and direct fiscal/macroeconomic policy rolethrough its participation in the 'Troika' and ELA -were challenged publicly by ECB Governing
Council members themselves, Member State governments, national and European parliaments, 'credible' and controversial academic economists and legal scholars, and a number of other technocratic institutions -including the IMF. The extensive debates on ECB policy in the media and the rapid decline in public trust are also evidence of public interest in ECB decisions. The very notion of 'the general interest' in this 'area' remains problematic.
The European Central Bank is at a crossroads. Its original mandate was to be an independent technocratic institution, the legitimacy and credibility of which was set in terms of its price stability mandate. However, from the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, ECB nonconventional monetary policies had significant, if indirect, impact upon the direction of macroeconomic policy in euro area Member States -and in a manner that contradicted the terms of the central bank's delegation as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty. In light of the political salience of these policies and their impact, it is questionable whether the independence of the ECB remains democratically viable. ECB policy-making became problematically controversial and politicized. The temporary absence of economic crisis in the euro area -at the time of writing in late 2018 -reduces the political focus placed upon the ECB and diminishes the political pressure for reform. With treaty reform unlikely, unilateral ECB efforts to improve its accountability to the European and national parliaments -in the context of broader efforts to reinforce the accountability of euro area economic governance -is the best we can hope for prior to the outbreak of the next crisis.
